A universal condition of empty knowledge stemming from the indiscriminate sowing of internal divisions is not to be confused with the growth of knowledge. Rather it exhibits a preference for a kind of knowing that commands silence.

Such divisions have never generated positive growth in the sense of producing structural lines that could serve as a foundation.

Rather the method has yielded only severely weakened lines whose calloused condition makes them easily confused for lines now made thick and strong.

Rilke made a nostalgia of this method, recognizing the only kind of ‘infinite ramified existence’ issuing from it as a crown of thorns. He lamented the overwhelming silence this tradition produces.

What are the ramifications of a scorched earth policy, for example? From these cracks now sprout the weeds of acquired fear associated with hardship, this fear which attaches as a predicate, a hardening envelope of cruelty forming around it, enclosing Being in its destiny; whereas actual hardship or non-trivial effort could have been blissfully unaware of itself, allowing for that kind of increase accompanied by advancing Being.

Kant flagged the lack of any guiding principle as the basis of his dissatisfaction with the inductive method, and parted ways with the Aristotelian making of cuts that arose “rhapsodically from a search at haphazard after pure conceptions” (62).

But even cuts ‘systematically’ made to order in accordance with the terminus of sensation, in preparation for a final arrival at constructed meaning that presents itself as evidence, this only ever has been the false distinction taken for true that gets produced along with the duplication of the cut and a training along these lines, since how can these be true if they cannot be other than true?

Where Kant wrote that employing the inductive method alone is what is meant by induction, he outlined in the most obscure means possible a methodology of intimacy and betrayal, of acquaintance and severing of ties wherever there is a positioning at the border between two more or less well-defined objects – of oneself as one who has sufficiently penetrated the work of another and of a provisional proposition, admitted as possible “for now” to allow for error correction later.

But if in this method there can be understood a reason, an attempt to effect a transference, what is it that is transferred? To call it knowledge that facilitates transformation, a necessary ritual step on the way to metamorphosis, merely romanticizes what Cesar Aira’s unreliable narrator has already confessed: that at bottom what is at stake is ‘vitality,’ an appropriation of style, a way to manage one’s spiritual and material possessions.

(This recognition must be what prompted Levi-Strauss’ astonishment that induction was attempted on him while in the remote jungles of South America (which famous anecdote surely justified his own obscurantism)).

Lacan demonstrated in his lectures on structuring repression Kant’s objections that induction alone without the faculty of judgement would place understanding at the mercy of conceptions and their suggestive power.

Symptomatic of a structuring repression being in force presently is that it cannot be said. This is the common wisdom Lacan made available for critique while in the same set of lectures siding with it.

The simultaneity served as proof of the constructed nature of structuring repressions in its prompting of the question of how it is that the symptom could be the contradiction if it is homogenous with the repressed.

The significance of this homogeneity Lacan observed between repressed and symptom was said to be lost as soon as one tried to make of the concept the thing itself.

Rather the concept, which is not the thing itself but a constituent element of it having to do with the time of its arrival, is symptomatic of there having been a structuring repression.

The impermissibility of saying that a structuring repression exists at the time of its being in operation or materially evident also must have informed Heisenberg’s letter cautioning Einstein (Pais 1982).

This was what marked as radical and contestatory Einstein’s demonstration that the materially evident could be expressed conceptually, because it exposed what is empirically evident as distinct from what is a social construct that passes itself off as self-evident.

However, if a simplified (but not reductive) mathematical expression of objective reality does coincide with objective reality itself, this isn’t to say there aren’t other, more appropriate and less overreaching contexts in which conceptualization is only possible after the fact of materiality. Nor is it to say a qualitative difference in the time between one iteration and another doesn’t exist.

It’s even possible that somewhere there resides a sincere desired outcome that the second iteration of a structuring repression would be an opportunity for the lifting of the repression, which happy ending would require the relinquishment of the qualitative limitation.

This second iteration (for which I would now be equipped) evidences the idea of a heterogenous time, one that is more or less recognizable, whereas the significance of the homogeneity Lacan observes between repressed and symptom resides in a continuity to be located at its originating locus of exchange. Yesterday’s epiphany recognized that a dying spirit comes to insist upon itself at precisely the time when it needs to give ground. Today’s prevailing spirit is one that has long been groomed for seamless integration and alignment with the empirical, the self-evident.

Because, otherwise, why would the exact same thing return unless there was never a departure?

If language is structured like the unconscious, alliteration is the mark of this refusal to forget or else indicates some part of time has not undergone a qualitative differentiation.

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